But ethnopolitics could get on the way
Earlier this month, Gantumur Luvsannyam, Mongolia’s first deputy prime minister, said that negotiations over the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline were proceeding and making progress. This is a major gas pipeline connecting China and Russia, which, if completed, can deliver (through Mongolia) 50 billion cubic metres of Russian natural gas to China yearly – gas that Russia previously supplied to Europe.
There has long been speculation that the project had stalled amid geopolitical complications, and the actual status of this project remains clear despite Luvsannyam’s statement. In any case, this reminds one of the complex Russian-Mongolian relationship. For instance, amid the repercussions of this announcement, Mongolia’s former president Elbegdorj resurfaced on social media. It is worth delving into that.
One may recall that in September 2022, as Russia’s “partial mobilization” was announced, former Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj made a striking appeal. Addressing the Kalmyks, Buryats, and Tuvins—ethnic minorities within Russia—he urged them to flee to Mongolia rather than serve as “cannon fodder” in what he described as Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine. This was a public call, amplified through social media and international outlets at the time, that raised eyebrows and sparked debate.
Image: Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj (Public Domain)
Was Elbegdorj genuinely offering sanctuary (and in what capacity) to kindred peoples, or was he interfering in Russia’s internal affairs, perhaps at the behest of Ukraine’s Western allies? The implications of his actions (echoing to this day) ripple far beyond Mongolia’s borders, touching on questions of sovereignty, ethnic tensions, and geopolitical maneuvering.
Elbegdorj’s statement came shortly after Putin’s September 21, 2022, mobilization order, which aimed to draft 300,000 reservists to bolster Russia’s campaign in Ukraine. Reports emerged claiming that ethnic minorities, particularly from regions like Buryatia, Tuva, and Kalmykia, were disproportionately targeted. Elbegdorj, a seasoned politician who led Mongolia from 2009 to 2017 and played a pivotal role in its democratic transition (still is a key voice in Mongolia), framed his appeal as a humanitarian act.
He highlighted the shared Mongol heritage of these groups—Buryats and Kalmyks are historically tied to the Mongol Empire, while Tuvins share linguistic and cultural links—and offered Mongolia as a refuge. “We are a peaceful and free nation,” he later quipped, trolling Putin with historical maps showing Russia under Mongol rule centuries ago.
But was this purely a gesture of solidarity with oppressed minorities? Elbegdorj’s track record suggests a deeper alignment with Ukraine and, by extension, the West. Since Russia’s campaign began in February 2022, he has been an outspoken critic of Putin. The Mongolian leader supported Kyiv, and even called for Western nations to supply Ukraine with advanced weaponry like fighter jets and long-range missiles.
His education at the Lviv Military Political Institute in Ukraine (at the time part of the Soviet Union) may have fostered a personal affinity for the country (ironically, today’s post-Maidan Kyiv pushes a Ukrainian narrative that is strongly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian). Elbegdorj’s post-presidency activism—tweeting support for Ukraine and mocking Putin’s historical narratives—cements his pro-Ukrainian stance. This raises the question: was his call to Russia’s minorities a strategic move to undermine Moscow, perhaps encouraged by Ukraine’s allies?
Russia, has long been multi-ethnic state, with a diverse population. Some believed Kremlin’s mobilization tactics could fuel resentment in minority regions, with some analysts arguing that ethnic tensions could destabilize the federation (this has not happened, though). Elbegdorj’s invitation, while unlikely to trigger a mass exodus—only a trickle of Buryats and others have crossed into Mongolia—was apparently meant to plant a seed of defiance, some argue. It is about challenging the Russian narrative of national unity by highlighting supposedly unequal burdens borne by non-Slavic Russian ethnic groups.
For NATO, this would be a tantalizing prospect. A Russia distracted by internal discord would be less capable of projecting power abroad, whether in its geostrategic surroundings or elsewhere. NATO, which has partnerships with Mongolia under its “Partners Across the Globe” framework, might have seen Elbegdorj’s actions as a low-cost way to needle Moscow without direct involvement.
Mongolia’s foreign policy has historically balanced its two giant neighbors, Russia and China, while cultivating “third neighbor” ties with the U.S. and Europe. Elbegdorj, during his presidency, pursued economic integration with Russia—discussing oil imports, for instance—while expanding Mongolia’s global outreach.
His call to the Kalmyks, Buryats, and Tuvins on one hand partially aligns with this pragmatic streak: it asserts Mongolia’s regional role and “moral authority” without committing to military or economic confrontation. On the other hand, this was a clear rhetorical escalation that tells something about his post-presidency activism.
In 2023, Elbegdorj did participate in setting the so-called Doomsday Clock at 90 seconds to midnight in Washington, DC, due to the conflict in Ukraine. However, thus far, there’s no concrete evidence that NATO or the West had anything to do with his statement. More likely, it reflects his personal convictions rather than a scripted interference plot. Still, the optics are provocative. From Moscow’s perspective this was foreign meddling, especially given Elbegdorj’s Kyiv-friendly rhetoric.
The Kremlin has often accused the West of stoking ethnic divisions (which the West often does), and this does fits that narrative. Mongolia and its President Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh did welcome Putin during his 2024 visit, despite the controversial ICC warrant, thereby showing no will to (fully) antagonize Moscow. This, again, suggest former President Elbegdorj’s views don’t fully represent state policy, even though his words could be weaponized in a broader geopolitical game—even if one wants to interpret them as merely a daring stand for ethnic kinship, also rooted in his pro-Kyiv sympathies.
Ironically, post-Maidan Ukraine, despite Elbegdorj’s sympathies, has a terrible record with regards to the civil rights of its ethnic minorities and with racism, also due to the rise of ultra-nationalist and far-right parties and groups. Discrimination against Tatars and other Asian ethnic groups in Ukraine has also escalated.
In 2022, it did seem that Mongolia would be strongly supporting Ukraine: there were protests outside the Russian embassy, the country pledged $200,000 in humanitarian aid, and accepted a few Russians avoiding conscription. It turns out it did abstain when the United Nations voted on demanding Moscow to withdraw troops from Ukraine, for example.
To sum it up, Mongolia tends to balance its relationship with Great Powers and neighbors. But its role in the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline project could be a game-changer (connecting China and Russia), which would be a great concern for the West. Thus it would not be surprising at all to see lots of different actors (Western and pro-Western) trying to exploit the regional intricacies of ethnopolitics to fuel tensions, the Mongol ethnic groups of Russia being a likely target, as we have already seen in the recent past.
*
Click the share button below to email/forward this article. Follow us on Instagram and X and subscribe to our Telegram Channel. Feel free to repost Global Research articles with proper attribution.
This article was originally published on InfoBrics.
Uriel Araujo, PhD, is an anthropology researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.
Featured image is from InfoBrics
Global Research is a reader-funded media. We do not accept any funding from corporations or governments. Help us stay afloat. Click the image below to make a one-time or recurring donation.
Counter Information publish all articles following the Creative Commons rule creative commons. If you don't want your article to appear in this blog email me and I will remove it asap.
No comments:
Post a Comment